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SECURING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
James E. Fleming*
INTRODUCTION
The brochure for the conference frames the questions for our panel
on The Constitutional Essentials of Political Liberalism as "What are
the implications of Rawls's conceptions of justice as fairness and
political liberalism for constitutional theory? Might his account of
constitutional essentials provide a useful guiding framework for
conceiving the scheme of basic liberties embodied in the American
Constitution? How thin are the commitments of our Constitution as
compared with our richer commitments to constitutional justice and
political justice? What are the implications of Rawls's work for
theory of judicial review and for enforcement of constitutional rights
and obligations outside the courts through legislative and executive
institutions?" My Article will focus on the first and second questions.
But it will have implications for the third and fourth as well.
The Article has three parts. In Part I, I outline a constitutional
constructivism that is analogous to the political constructivism that
Rawls develops in Political Liberalism.1 I reprise previous work, in
which I have developed a constitutional theory with two fundamental
themes: first, securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for
deliberative democracy, and second, securing the basic liberties that
are preconditions for deliberative autonomy.2 In prior work, I have
* I prepared this Article for the Conference on Rawls and the Law, held at Fordham
University School of Law on November 7-8, 2003. I want to thank Linda McClain
and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments and Carrie Tendler and Devon Filas for
helpful research assistance. I especially want to thank Tim Scanlon for writing a
thoughtful, characteristically insightful and incisive comment on the Article.
I had the good fortune to study with Professor John Rawls while I was a
student at Harvard Law School from 1982-85. I took his graduate seminar in Political
Philosophy and the graduate section of his undergraduate course in Social and
Political Philosophy. He was quite encouraging and helpful to me as I attempted to
work up my ideas in the papers for his courses, in my Ph.D. dissertation in the
Department of Politics at Princeton University, and in my first several published
articles. I have been deeply honored to know and to learn from John Rawls. And I
have greatly appreciated the opportunity to organize the live conference and this
symposium volume to reflect upon the implications of his work for law. For that
opportunity, I am grateful to the support of Dean William Michael Treanor. For
advice at every stage, I am indebted to Ben Zipursky and Linda McClain.
1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996).
2. James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev.
211 (1993).
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elaborated upon the second fundamental theme.3 In Part II, I sketch
certain aspects of the first fundamental theme. I take up the
commitments to guaranteeing the fair value of the equal political
liberties and protecting free and informed political processes. I
explore what the structure of First Amendment law would look like if
we were committed, not to protecting an absolutist First Amendment
in isolation from the rest of the Constitution, but to securing a fully
adequate scheme of the basic liberties as a whole.
In Part III, I continue this exploration by focusing on four
important Supreme Court cases that involve clashes between the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of expression and the Equal
Protection Clause's concern for equal citizenship. In three out of four
of these cases, the Court protected freedom of expression to the
exclusion (or indeed erasure) of equal citizenship. First, I present
Rawls's own critique of Buckley v. Valeo4 as an exemplar of how to
secure equal protection or equal participation together with freedom
of expression. Second, I sketch an analogous critique of R.A. V. v.
City of St. Paul for privileging freedom of expression over equal
protection. Third, I analyze Roberts v. United States Jaycees6 as an
exemplar of how the Supreme Court itself on occasion has taken
equal citizenship seriously in the context of freedom of expression and
association. Finally, with this example on hand, I criticize Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale7 for privileging freedom of association over equal
protection. Throughout, my aim is to suggest that a Rawlsian guiding
framework of basic liberties might help frame our judgments
concerning what to do when confronting clashes between freedom of
expression and equal protection. Those judgments would be guided
by the aspiration to accord priority to the family of basic liberties as a
whole, not to give priority to freedom of expression over equal
protection.
I. AN OUTLINE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
A. A Guiding Framework for Securing Deliberative Democracy and
Deliberative Autonomy
Constitutional constructivism advances a guiding framework with
two fundamental themes, securing deliberative democracy and
securing deliberative autonomy. I develop this guiding framework by
analogy to Rawls's political constructivism, but I make no claim that
3. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
The material contained in Part I is drawn from id. at 17-23. See also Fleming, supra
note 2, at 281-97 (developing a fuller outline for a constitutional constructivism).
4. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
5. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
6. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
7. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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everything Rawls argues is required by justice is also mandated by our
Constitution. Nor do I rely upon Rawls as an authority for what the
Constitution means. I simply use the guiding framework because it
suggests certain interpretive strategies to help orient our
deliberations, reflections, and judgments about our Constitution and
our constitutional democracy.8 The usefulness of the framework is to
be assessed by ordinary criteria for an acceptable theory of
constitutional interpretation and judicial review.9 To explain that
framework, I must put forth several abstract conceptions from
Rawls's theory.
1. Political Conception of Justice: Fair Terms of Social Cooperation
on the Basis of Mutual Respect and Trust
In Political Liberalism, Rawls reformulates his well-known
theory-justice as fairness-as an example of a political liberalism or
a political conception of justice, as distinguished from a
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral conception of the
good.1" First, political liberalism accepts the "fact of reasonable
pluralism"-the fact that a diversity of reasonable yet conflicting and
irreconcilable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines may be affirmed by citizens in the free exercise of their
capacity for a conception of the good-as a feature of the political
culture of a constitutional democracy, not to be regretted and not
soon to pass away.1 Second, political liberalism emphasizes the
related "fact of oppression"-the fact that a single comprehensive
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine could be established as a
shared basis of political agreement or public justification in a
constitutional democracy only through the intolerably oppressive use
of coercive political power-as an entailment of accepting the fact of
reasonable pluralism. 2 Political liberalism generalizes the principle of
religious toleration to apply to reasonable conceptions of the good. 3
Despite these two related facts, Rawls argues that citizens in a
constitutional democracy who hold opposing and irreconcilable
8. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 156, 368 (arguing that the
proper role of his conception of justice is as a framework which may help others in
their deliberations on constitutional essentials).
9. See Fleming, supra note 2, at 298-300 (arguing that constitutional
constructivism better satisfies John Hart Ely's three criteria for an acceptable theory
than does his own theory). Ely's three criteria are: (1) how well the theory fits and
justifies the constitutional document and underlying constitutional order; (2) whether
it is consistent with and supportive of the underlying political system; and (3) whether
it assigns judges a role that they are well situated to perform. See John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust 87-104 (1980).
10. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at xvii-xix.
11. Id. at 36-37, 144.
12. Id. at 37.
13. Id. at 9-10, 154.
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conceptions of the good, such as comprehensive religious,
philosophical, or moral doctrines, may be able to find a shared basis
of reasonable political agreement or public justification through an
overlapping consensus concerning a political conception of justice.
This sort of consensus would obtain where different persons, from the
standpoint of their own divergent conceptions of the good, affirmed a
shared political conception of justice.14 Such a political conception of
justice, with the following basic liberties embodied in a constitution,
would provide fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual
respect and trust that citizens might reasonably be expected to
endorse, whatever their particular conceptions of the good.
By analogy to Rawls's political liberalism, constitutional
constructivism accepts the fact of reasonable pluralism and recognizes
the related fact of oppression. Moreover, it conceives our
Constitution as partially embodying a political conception of justice
that provides fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual
respect and trust. It does not, however, import any basic liberties
from Rawls's theory of justice as fairness as such, irrespective of
whether they have a firm grounding in our constitutional practice,
tradition, and culture.
2. Conception of Citizens as Free and Equal Persons: The Two
Moral Powers
Constitutional constructivism, like Rawls's political liberalism,
understands our basic liberties as being grounded on a conception of
citizens as free and equal persons, together with a conception of
society as a fair system of social cooperation.15 It views such persons
engaged in such cooperation as having two moralpowers.
The first moral power is the capacity for a sense of justice-the
capacity to understand, apply, and act from (and not merely in
accordance with) the political conception of justice that characterizes
the fair terms of social cooperation in a constitutional democracy.
Citizens apply this capacity in deliberating about and judging the
justice of basic institutions and social policies, as well as about the
common good.16
The second moral power is the capacity for a conception of the
good-the capacity to form, revise, and rationally pursue a conception
of the good, individually and in association with others, over a
complete life. A conception of the good is a conception of what is
valuable in human life. It typically consists of ends and aims derived
from certain religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines, as well as
attachments to other persons and loyalties to various groups and
14. Id. passim.
15. See id. at 15-20, 29-35, 299-304.
16. Id. at 19, 302, 332.
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associations. Citizens apply this capacity, their power of deliberative
reason, in deliberating about and deciding how to live their own
lives.17
The basic idea is that by virtue of their two moral powers, persons
are free, and their having these powers makes them equal. Possession
of the two moral powers constitutes the basis of the status of free and
equal citizenship.18  The basic liberties are understood as
preconditions for the development and exercise of the two moral
powers.' 9
3. Deliberative Democracy and Deliberative Autonomy: The Two
Fundamental Cases
Constitutional constructivism arranges our basic liberties so as to
show their relation to the two fundamental cases in which citizens
exercise their two moral powers. The first fundamental case is that of
deliberative democracy: The equal political liberties and freedom of
thought enable citizens to develop and exercise their first moral
power (their capacity for a sense of justice) in understanding,
applying, and acting from their conception of justice in deliberating
about and judging the justice of basic institutions and social policies,
as well as about the common good.20 In the first instance, the
Constitution is seen as establishing a "just and workable political
procedure" without imposing any explicit constitutional restrictions
on legislative outcomes.21 It incorporates the equal political liberties
and seeks to guarantee their fair value, so that the processes of
political decision will be open to all on a roughly equal basis.2 It also
17. Id. at 19, 302, 332, 335.
18. Id. at 19, 29-35, 79, 109; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 77, at 441-49 (rev.
ed. 1999).
19. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 332. For an insightful analysis of
Rawls's political conception of the person, see Frank I. Michelman, The Subject of
Liberalism, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1807 (1994) (reviewing Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra
note 1).
20. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 332-35. For the sake of
simplicity, I use the term "deliberative democracy" to refer to this first fundamental
case or theme. James W. Nickel has criticized Rawls's idea of the first fundamental
case as being too narrowly defined. James W. Nickel, Rethinking Rawls's Theory of
Liberty and Rights, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 763, 781-83 (1994). I broaden it by
proposing a theme of deliberative democracy that is quite similar to Cass Sunstein's
principal (and general) theme of deliberative democracy. See Fleming, supra note 2,
at 256, 292-93 (analyzing Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993)).
21. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 337.
22. As discussed below, Rawls explains that the guarantee of "fair value" means
that "the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or
economic position, must be approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in the
sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence the
outcome of political decisions." Id. at 327. "Formal equality is not enough" where the
equal political liberties are concerned. Id. at 361. For a provocative analysis that has
affinities to Rawls's idea, see Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A
20041 1439
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protects freedom of thought (including freedom of speech and press,
freedom of assembly, and the like), so that the exercise of those
liberties in those processes will be "free and informed., 23
The second fundamental case is that of deliberative autonomy:
Liberty of conscience and freedom of association enable citizens to
develop and exercise their second moral power (their capacity for a
conception of the good) in forming, revising, and rationally pursuing
their conceptions of the good, individually and in association with
others, over a complete life-that is, to apply their power of
deliberative reason to deliberating about and deciding how to live
their own lives.24 In the second instance, the Constitution is seen as
establishing constitutional restrictions upon the grounds for political
decisions.25  It protects liberty of conscience and freedom of
association both to secure citizens' free exercise of deliberative
autonomy and to assure that political decisions will not be justifiable
solely on the basis of comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral
conceptions of the good.
Finally, constitutional constructivism connects the remaining (and
supporting) basic liberties to the two fundamental cases by noting that
it is necessary to secure them in order to guarantee properly the
preceding basic liberties associated with deliberative democracy and
deliberative autonomy. These remaining and supporting liberties
include "the liberty and integrity of the person (violated, for example,
by slavery and serfdom, and by the denial of freedom of movement
and occupation) and the rights and liberties covered by the rule of
law., 26 The constitutional essentials also include due process of law,
equal protection of the laws, the right to personal property, and the
right to basic necessities.27 In other words, guarantees of these basic
Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1204 (1994); see also
Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign
Finance (2002).
23. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 335, 337.
24. See id. at 332-35. Deliberative autonomy includes not only deliberation but
also decision making. For the sake of simplicity, I intend to encompass the concepts
of "deliberating about and deciding how to live their own lives" within the
expressions "deliberative autonomy" or "deliberating about their conception of the
good." For an explanation of my usage of the term "deliberative autonomy" to refer
to this second fundamental case or theme, see Fleming, supra note 2, at 253 n.210 and
Fleming, supra note 3, at 30-31. Nickel has criticized Rawls's idea of the second
fundamental case as being too broadly defined. Nickel, supra note 20, at 782-83. I
narrow it by outlining a theme of deliberative autonomy that is bounded by a
criterion of significance. See Fleming, supra note 3, at 40-43.
25. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 337-38.
26. Id. at 335. The rights and liberties covered by the rule of law include, for
example, procedural due process, habeas corpus, freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and freedom from self-incrimination. See Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, supra note 18, § 38, at 206-13; Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning,
Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 26, 31 (1992).
27. Notably, the constitutional essentials do not include Rawls's famous
"difference principle," that "[s]ocial and economic inequalities.., are to be to the
1440 [Vol. 72
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liberties are preconditions for securing both deliberative democracy
and deliberative autonomy.
Possession of this whole family of basic liberties constitutes the
common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship.28
Moreover, the preconditions for both deliberative democracy and
deliberative autonomy are preconditions for the sovereignty of free
and equal citizens.29
B. The Constitution as Securing Deliberative Democracy and
Deliberative Autonomy: The Two Fundamental Themes
Constitutional constructivism conceives our Constitution as a
"constitution of principle," which embodies (or aspires to embody) a
coherent scheme of basic liberties, or fair terms of social cooperation
on the basis of mutual respect and trust, for our constitutional
democracy. The Constitution is not merely a "constitution of detail,"
which enacts a discrete list of particular rights narrowly conceived by
framers and ratifiers.3 ° Nor does it simply establish a procedural
greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society." Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 1, at 6-7, 228-30, 337. Moreover, the right to basic necessities
may not be judicially enforceable in the absence of legislative or executive measures.
Similarly, the right to personal property may be judicially underenforced. Fleming,
supra note 3, at 45. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls argues that a liberal political
conception of justice, and a reasonably just constitutional democracy, must assure
"sufficient all-purpose means to enable all citizens to make intelligent and effective
use of their freedoms." John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 49 (1999). He mentions five
kinds of institutions or arrangements that are necessary to prevent "social and
economic inequalities from becoming excessive" and to achieve stability: (a) "[a]
certain fair equality of opportunity"; (b) "[a] decent distribution of income and
wealth"; (c) "[s]ociety as employer of last resort"; (d) "[b]asic health care assured for
all citizens"; and (e) "[p]ublic financing of elections and ways of assuring the
availability of public information on matters of policy." Id. at 49, 50.
28. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 335. For a critique of Rawls's
list of basic liberties, see Nickel, supra note 20, at 766-72 (proposing a reconstructed
list).
29. See Freeman, supra note 26, at 30-33 (arguing that equal political rights and
other basic liberties such as liberty of conscience and freedom of association are
essential to democratic sovereignty).
30. See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 119, 126-29 (1993) (contrasting a
"constitution of principle" (a scheme of abstract, normative principles) with a
"constitution of detail" (a list of particular, antique rules) (emphasis omitted)); see
also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) ("Had those who drew and
ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might
have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight.... As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom."); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901
(1992) (conceiving the Constitution as a "covenant" or "coherent succession"
embodying "ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one"); id. at 913-
21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting the
constitutionally protected concept of liberty as embodying abstract principles); id. at
940 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (construing the Court's personal-liberty cases as protecting the
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framework of democracy. Furthermore, constitutional constructivism
views interpreting the Constitution as specifying basic liberties in
terms of the significance of an asserted liberty for the development
and exercise of one (or both) of the two moral powers in one (or
both) of the two fundamental cases.31
But constitutional constructivism distinguishes between the partial,
judicially enforceable Constitution and the whole Constitution that is
binding outside the courts upon legislatures, executives, and citizens
generally.32 In other words, it is a theory of the Constitution, not
merely a theory of judicial revietv. Certain constitutional norms,
including aspects of deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy, may be judicially underenforced because of the
institutional limits of courts, and left to the political processes for
fuller enforcement. For example, the Constitution might impose
affirmative obligations upon the legislative and executive branches to
provide basic necessities for all citizens, but it might not afford a
judicially enforceable right to these necessities in the absence of
legislative or executive measures.33
Constitutional constructivism entails a theory of judicial review with
an active role for courts with respect to the two fundamental cases or
corresponding themes: first, securing the basic liberties that are
preconditions for deliberative democracy, and second, securing the
basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative autonomy. Both
themes are necessary to afford everyone the common and guaranteed
status of free and equal citizenship in our constitutional democracy.
Courts should exercise stringent review to strike down political
decisions that do not respect the two types of basic liberties because
both are preconditions for the trustworthiness of such decisions. (The
remaining and supporting basic liberties, as stated above, also must be
guaranteed in order to secure these preconditions.)
Constitutional constructivism's first theme emphasizes the equal
general right of privacy rather than a "laundry list of particular rights").
31. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 332-40; Freeman, supra note
26, at 30-33.
32. Fleming, supra note 2, at 291; see also Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note
1, at 240. Others have expressed similar views concerning the gap between the
partial, judicially enforceable Constitution and the whole Constitution that is binding
outside the courts. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy, and
the Question of Judicial Review: A Comment, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1407 (2004);
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213 (1978); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice
in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev.
410, 419 (1993); Lawrence G. Sager, The Why of Constitutional Essentials, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 1421 (2004); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 9-10, 138-40, 145-61, 350.
33. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 20, at 145-53; Fleming, supra note 2, at 291-92.
It is not the role of courts to say in the first instance what arrangements are necessary
to secure the preconditions for deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy,
but to assure that the arrangements enacted by legislatures do not flout these
preconditions. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 362.
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political liberties and freedom of thought. This theme resembles Cass
Sunstein's principal theme of securing deliberative democracy and, to
a lesser extent, John Hart Ely's dominant theme of reinforcing
representative democracy.34 It seeks to secure the preconditions for
political self-government, conceiving our political system as a public
facility for deliberation concerning the common good, not a veritable
political market for aggregation of self-interested preferences. 35 This
theme aims to assure that political decisions will be impartial in the
sense that they are justifiable on the basis of public-regarding reasons
(common good), not merely the self-interested preferences of private
groups or individuals. Also, it forbids political decisions that violate
the constraints of impartiality by denying equal citizenship on the
basis of morally irrelevant characteristics, such as race, sex, or sexual
orientation.
Constitutional constructivism's second theme is underwritten by
liberty of conscience and freedom of association. This theme
articulates and unifies the concerns for substantive liberties that
process-perfecting theories such as those of Sunstein and Ely recast or
neglect: liberty of conscience, freedom of intimate association,
decisional autonomy, decisional privacy, spatial privacy, bodily
integrity, and an antitotalitarian principle of liberty.36 It seeks to
secure these preconditions for personal self-government, or
deliberation and decision by citizens, individually and in association
with others, about how to lead their own lives. Moreover, at least
where constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at
stake, this theme aspires to assure that political decisions will be
impartial in the sense that they are justifiable on the basis of public
reasons (common ground)-on grounds that citizens generally can
reasonably be expected to accept, whatever their particular
conceptions of the good, because they come within an overlapping
consensus concerning a political conception of justice.37  These
constitutional restrictions must be honored if free and equal citizens
are to engage in social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and
trust in a constitutional democracy such as our own, which is
characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism and which
recognizes the related fact of oppression. Constitutional
constructivism conceives our polity as being subject to the limits of
public reason, rather than being free to make collective judgments
34. See Fleming, supra note 2, at 256, 292-93.
35. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 219-20, 359-63; Rawls, A
Theory of Justice, supra note 18, § 36, at 194-200, § 54, at 313-18.
36. See Fleming, supra note 2, at 233-35, 256-60, 294-95.
37. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 213-20, 223-30; Freeman,
supra note 26, at 17, 20-29.
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founded solely on comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical
conceptions of the good.38
Thus, constitutional constructivism is concerned with securing
preconditions for processes of deliberation and decision with respect
to both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. By virtue
of these concerns, it is a theory of constitutional democracy and
trustworthiness, an alternative to Ely's theory of representative
democracy and distrust. I mean trustworthiness in the sense of
Rawls's remark: "By publicly affirming the basic liberties citizens ...
express their mutual respect for one another as reasonable and
trustworthy, as well as their recognition of the worth all citizens attach
to their way of life."39 Constitutional constructivism is a fuller theory
of perfecting the trustworthy Constitution than is Ely's (or Sunstein's)
process-perfecting theory.
The guiding framework also demonstrates that constitutional
constructivism's conception of citizens (with two moral powers) is writ
large in its conception of our Constitution (with two fundamental
themes).4 ° It presents our Constitution as embodying (or aspiring to
embody) a coherent scheme of basic liberties fit for use by free and
equal citizens, rather than as enacting an antique list appropriate for
ancestor worship.4  And constitutional constructivism frames
questions of constitutional interpretation in terms of the significance
of an asserted liberty for such citizens' application of their two moral
powers in the two fundamental cases that arise in our constitutional
scheme.
38. Rawls speaks of the limits of public reason as imposing "a moral, not a legal,
duty-the duty of civility." Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 217. He
subsequently added: "I emphasize that [the moral duty of civility] is not a legal duty,
for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech." John Rawls, The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997), reprinted in John Rawls, Collected Papers 573,
577 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). Elsewhere, I plan to elaborate upon the constraints
of public reason in our constitutional democracy. For valuable discussions and
applications of Rawls's idea of public reason to constitutional theory, see Samuel
Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution, 69
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 619 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Inclusive Public Reason, 75 Pac.
Phil. Q. 217 (1994); see also Samuel Freeman, Public Reason and Political
Justifications, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2021 (2004).
39. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 319; see Ely, supra note 9, at 101-
04.
40. Cf. The Republic of Plato II, at 55, VIII, at 266-68 (Francis MacDonald
Cornford trans., 1941) (suggesting that the constitution of individuals is writ large in
the constitution of a state).
41. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)
(criticizing antifederalists, who argued for a narrow construction of the Constitution
in general and the commerce power in particular, contending that they would
"explain away the constitution of our country, and leave it, a magnificent structure,
indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use"). On narrow conceptions of originalism
as forms of "ancestor-worship," see Freeman, supra note 26, at 16.
[Vol. 721444
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II. SECURING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
In previous work, I have elaborated upon the second fundamental
theme: securing deliberative autonomy.42 Here I shall sketch certain
features of the first fundamental theme: securing deliberative
democracy. As stated above, constitutional constructivism views the
Constitution as incorporating the equal political liberties and seeking
to guarantee their fair value, so that the processes of political decision
will be open to all on a roughly equal basis. The Constitution also
protects freedom of thought (including freedom of speech and press,
freedom of assembly, and the like), so that the exercise of those
liberties in those processes will be free and informed.43 In Part II.A., I
discuss the priority of the basic liberties, including those related to the
first fundamental theme. In Part II.B., I take up the commitment to a
free and informed political process. Finally, in Part II.C., I pursue the
idea of guaranteeing the fair value of the equal political liberties.
It is because of their role and significance in relation to the political
process and hence to the exercise of the first moral power in the first
fundamental case that a Rawlsian constitutional constructivism treats
the equal political liberties in a special way as expressed by the
guarantee of their fair value.44 The equal political liberties are in this
sense primus inter pares, first among the equal basic liberties that as a
family have priority over the pursuit of utilitarian public good and the
imposition of perfectionist values. Rawls's constructivist framework
in this respect parallels the doctrine of "preferred freedoms" or
"preferred position" outlined in footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Co.41 and elaborated in Ely's Democracy and
Distrust.46
My larger project is to develop a Constitution-perfecting theory as
an alternative to the process-perfecting theory advanced by Ely (as
well as to that propounded by Sunstein).47 My general tack is to argue
that a constitutional constructivism in the spirit of Rawls's political
liberalism is superior to Ely's theory. I shall take the same tack here,
building upon Ely's analysis of the Constitution's commitments to
42. See Fleming, supra note 3.
43. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 335, 337.
44. Id. at 330. Rawls argues that "[i]t is not because political life and the
participation by everyone in democratic self-government is regarded as the
preeminent good for fully autonomous citizens." Id. Even so, Rawls does not side
with that strand of modern liberalism that regards the political liberties as having only
instrumental value, and as lacking intrinsic value. See id. at 298-99. He is, after all,
trying to dispel the conflict between the traditions of democratic thought associated
with Constant's distinction between the liberties of the moderns and the liberties of
the ancients. Id. at 299.
45. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
46. See Ely, supra note 9, at 75-77.
47. See James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy (book in progress
under contract with University of Chicago Press); Fleming, supra note 3; Fleming,
supra note 2.
1445
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
open political process, but suggesting that a Rawlsian theory might
provide a better account in certain respects. I shall deploy a Rawlsian
guiding framework in exploring what the structure of First
Amendment law would look like if we were committed, not to
protecting an absolutist First Amendment in isolation from the rest of
the Constitution, but to securing a fully adequate scheme of the basic
liberties as a whole.
A. The Priority of the Basic Liberties, or Taking Rights Seriously
Let us recall two familiar refrains within liberal political philosophy
and constitutional theory about the status of basic liberties or rights.
One, associated with Rawls, is about the "priority of the basic
liberties."48  The other, associated with Ronald Dworkin, is about
"taking rights seriously."49 These two formulations arose in part in
response to concerns that utilitarians, pragmatists, and balancers of all
stripes do not appreciate or honor the nerve or force of claims of basic
liberties or rights. To generalize, there is a twofold worry: (1) that
these balancers reduce claims of basic liberties or rights of individuals
to mere claims of interests or (2) that they elevate mere claims of
interests of government into claims of rights.
Justice Felix Frankfurter-balancer par excellence and bete noire
of any serious proponent of "taking rights seriously"-famously
illustrates both moves. In Dennis v. United States,5" in concurrence, he
reduces the First Amendment freedom of expression of individuals to
a mere interest which Congress may balance against the claims of the
whole nation to national security. And in the two flag-salute cases,
Minersville School District v. Gobitis (for the majority)5 and West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (in dissent),52 he frames the
clash between Jehovah's Witnesses' freedom of religion and freedom
of expression, on the one hand, and the government's interest in
inculcating patriotism, on the other, as a "clash of rights."53
In both instances, Frankfurter was nailed for making these moves.
In Dennis, Justice Hugo Black did so in dissent, powerfully arguing
that the First Amendment is an absolute that is not simply to be
balanced away out of concern for national security. 4 In Barnette,
Justice Robert Jackson for the majority (over Frankfurter's dissent)
pointedly argued that there was no clash of rights here: Instead, there
48. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 18, § 82, at 474-80; Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 1, at 294-99.
49. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
50. 341 U.S. 494, 517-61 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
51. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
52. 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
53. Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, Sotirios A. Barber & Stephen Macedo,
American Constitutional Interpretation 1267-69 (3d ed. 2003) (reprinting letter from
Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone concerning Minersville).
54. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 579-81 (Black, J., dissenting).
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was a clash of individual rights of the Jehovah's Witnesses against the
claims of governmental authority to inculcate orthodoxy.55
Both of these cases involved the First Amendment, and
constitutional and political theorists who give "priority" to basic
liberties or who "take rights seriously" are rightly proud to take their
stand with Black and Jackson and against Frankfurter in these
battles.56 Moreover, many of the issues of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
that gave rise to the refrains about priority and taking rights seriously
involved clashes between individual rights against the government
and claims of governmental authority to restrict or regulate those
rights to pursue the national security or the good of all. 7 And those
clashes arose in situations where liberals rightly feared that the
government was overestimating the threat and also exaggerating the
fragility of our institutions and our way of life.
But all this should not blind us to the possibility that there might be
genuine clashes of rights, or more precisely, clashes of higher order
values or interests that underlie rights58 -unlike Frankfurter's
wrongheaded conception of a clash of rights-in which giving priority
to the family of basic liberties as a whole may preclude according
"absolutist" protection to First Amendment freedoms. Put another
way, we should face up to the possibility that in rightly being "anti-
balancing," we have overlooked the possibility of genuine clashes of
rights or values or interests, and we have failed to provide a
framework for thinking about how to address such clashes. The
general type of clash that I discuss below is the clash between concern
to protect freedom of expression, on the one hand, and concern to
secure equal citizenship for all, including racial, sexual, or sexual
orientation minorities, on the other.
In Part II.B., I consider how a conception of the First Amendment
inspired by a Rawlsian guiding framework might advance the debates
concerning absolutism versus balancing in the context of freedom of
55. Barnett, 319 U.S. at 630-31.
56. For examples of leading constitutional theorists who proudly took their stand
in favor of absolutism (or stringent protection of fundamental rights) over and against
balancing, see, for example, C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech
(1989); Dworkin, supra note 49; Ely, supra note 9; Thomas I. Emerson, The System of
Freedom of Expression (1970); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245. Leading political philosophers who take a similar
stance include Rawls. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 344, 352-56;
T.M. Scanlon, infra notes 64-65.
57. No one made this clearer than Ronald Dworkin, in his famous call for taking
rights seriously and in his arguments that individual rights are not simply to be
balanced against governmental claims of authority. See Dworkin, supra note 49, at
184-205.
58. T.M. Scanlon perceptively and rigorously argues that we should acknowledge
clashes of such higher order interests or values, but not clashes of institutionally
specified rights. See T.M. Scanlon, Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 1477, 1478-79 (2004).
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expression. In Part II.C., I consider how such a guiding framework
would apply to conflicts between protecting freedom of expression
and guaranteeing the fair value of the equal political liberties. Finally,
in Part III, I take up how it might apply to other conflicts between
freedom of expression and equal citizenship.
B. Free and Informed Political Process
The recurring debate in the jurisprudence of the First Amendment
between the "absolutists" and the "balancers"-epitomized in a
previous generation by the battles between Justice Black,59 on the one
hand, and Justices Frankfurter6' and John Marshall Harlan,61 on the
other-has been advanced considerably by Ely's (to say nothing of
Laurence H. Tribe's 62) two-track analytical framework63 and T.M.
Scanlon, Jr.'s theory of freedom of expression 64 and categories of
expression.65 I shall offer Rawls's framework of the basic liberties and
their priority66 as a theoretical structure that, like Ely's, promises to
assure a free and informed political process but that, unlike Ely's,
might satisfy hankerings to break out of a two-track framework for
analysis of the First Amendment. It also promises to advance the
debate about absolutism and balancing in this generation between
Justice Scalia, on the one hand, and Justice Stevens, on the other.
1. Ely's Two-Track Analytical Framework
Ely initially argued that the two contending approaches to the First
Amendment need not be regarded as mutually exclusive general
theories, but should be employed in tandem, with "categorization"
and "balancing" each playing its own legitimate and indispensable
role. 67 He subsequently recast these complementary approaches as an
59. Justice Black's absolutist view is put most forcefully in Hugo LaFayette Black,
A Constitutional Faith (1969), and Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 865 (1960).
60. See, for example, Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-61 (1951).
61. See, for example, Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
62. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-2, at 789-94 (2d ed.
1988).
63. Ely, supra note 9, at 105-16.
64. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204
(1972).
65. T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 519 (1979) [hereinafter Scanlon, Categories]; see also T.M. Scanlon, Jr.,
Content Regulation Reconsidered, in Judith Lichtenberg, Democracy and the Mass
Media 331 (1990).
66. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 334-40.
67. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1500-02 (1975).
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absolutist, categorical "unprotected messages" approach and a
"specific threat" approach.68
Ely argues that the unprotected messages approach is "the only
intelligible form of 'absolutism."' 69 Unlike Justice Black's version of
absolutism, Ely's version "does not purport to hold all expression or
speech constitutionally immune to government regulation, but rather
immunizes all expression save that which falls within a few clearly and
narrowly defined categories."7 Ely cautions that "[w]here the evil the
state is seeking to avert is one that is thought to arise from the
particular dangers of the message being conveyed,... the hazards of
political distortion and judicial acquiescence are at their peak."'" For
this reason, he argues, Justice Frankfurter's approach-"ad hoc
balancing [evaluations of specific threats] tempered with substantial
deference to the legislative judgment"72 -"mocks our commitment to
an open political process."73 Ely contends:
If the First Amendment is even to begin to serve its central function
of assuring an open political dialogue and process, we must seek to
minimize assessment of the dangerousness of the various messages
people want to communicate. That means, where state officials seek
to silence a message because they think it's dangerous, that we insist
that the message fall within some clearly and narrowly bounded
category of expression we have designated in advance as unentitled
to protection.
Historically, these categories of unprotected messages included libel,75
fighting words,76 obscenity,77 incitement to imminent lawless action,78
and commercial speech.79
Ely grants, however, that "[w]here the evil the state is seeking to
avert is one that is independent of the message being regulated, where
it arises from something other than a fear of how people will react to
what the speaker is saying[,] ... a 'specific threat' approach is the only
one that can be coherent."8 This approach must consider context and
assess the threat that the particular expressive event poses.
68. Ely, supra note 9, at 105-16.
69. Id. at 111.
70. Id. at 109-10.
71. Id. at 111.
72. Id. at 108.
73. Id. at 109.
74. Id. at 112.
75. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
76. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
77. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
78. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
79. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). But see Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (raising the level of protection
for commercial expression).
80. Ely, supra note 9, at 111.
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Ely warns that "[i]t is important that the distinction [between these
two approaches] not be misunderstood as, or telescoped into, one
simply between 'permissive review' and 'strict review."' 81 He cautions
against allowing the review of measures that are geared to averting an
evil other than the perceived dangerousness of the message "to
degenerate into what is essentially a 'reasonableness' test. 8 2 Ely
urges instead that courts should employ "the strictest available sort of
specific harm test, one that seriously insists on a clear and present
danger of a serious evil."83 For, he argues, courts must "guard against
slippage [into unstructured balancing tests] in all contexts."'  In this
sense, "'strict review' is always appropriate where free expression is in
issue."85
Ely distinguishes between a strong and a weak approach to
balancing-a "serious balancing version of less restrictive alternative
analysis" and a "weak, nay useless, 'no gratuitous inhibition'
approach."86  The strong approach is put forward, even if not
followed, in United States v. O'Brien:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.87
This "serious balancing version of less restrictive alternative analysis"
is presumably "the strictest available sort of specific harm test. '88
Furthermore, Ely admonishes that "[t]o construe the form of
review that is appropriate when messages are proscribed on the
theory that they are dangerous as anything short of an 'absolute'
protection of all speech that does not fall within some unprotected
category is to miss the central point of [his] discussion."89 To do so is
"to run the risk of converting that stricter brand of review.., into
simply a more demanding sort of balancing or specific harm test."90 In
the ellipsis of the foregoing quotation, Ely suggests that
"unfortunately a few recent decisions seem to do just this,"91 citing
81. Id. at 115.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 116.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Ely, supra note 67, at 1488-89.
87. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
88. Ely, supra note 9, at 116.
89. Id. at 115.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 115, 233-34 n.27. "Recent" as of 1980, when Ely wrote, but still timely
and significant.
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Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. (commercial speech), 92 Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc. (zoning regulation of "adult motion picture theaters"
and "adult book stores"), 93 and Buckley v. Valeo (campaign finance). 4
In these cases and their progeny, the Court in effect adapted the
test enunciated in O'Brien, which on Ely's analysis is appropriate only
on the specific threat or "balancing" track, to develop an intermediate
level of review between Ely's "absolutist" track of categories of fully
protected messages and the categories of unprotected messages.95 Ely
warns that, "to build protective barriers around free expression as
secure as words can make them," 96 we need to police these two tracks
more toughly. Indeed, these cases and their progeny pose a great
challenge to the two-track analytical framework, for they seem to fall
between the tracks. Below, I shall contend that they can be caught by
a Rawlsian constructivist framework and thus prevented from sliding
into an amorphous balancing test that, like Frankfurter's approach,
corrodes basic liberties. In outlining the implications of a Rawlsian
scheme for analysis of the First Amendment, I shall use Scanlon's
92. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
93. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
94. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
95. Virginia Pharmacy refers to a "different degree of protection" for commercial
speech. 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), per Justice Lewis F. Powell, applies a "four-
step analysis":
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. This test obviously resembles the test put forward in
United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Justice Harry A. Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment in Central Hudson, saw in the Court's four-part analysis
approval of "an intermediate level of scrutiny." 447 U.S. at 573.
In American Mini Theatres and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978), Justice John Paul Stevens, in opinions for the Court, but whose relevant
portions constituted mere opinions for a plurality, argued for a hierarchy of values
protected by the First Amendment. Concurring in the judgment and portions of the
opinion in American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 79, Justice Powell argued instead that
it was appropriate to analyze the permissibility of the zoning ordinance under the
four-part test of O'Brien. He concurred with similar reservations in Pacifica, 438 U.S.
at 761.
In Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16, the Court explicitly rejected the less-exacting
standard of O'Brien on the ground that the expenditure of money did not introduce a
non-speech element, purportedly applying "exacting scrutiny" instead. But this
"closest scrutiny," id. at 25, turns out, as Ely suggests, to be a stringent balancing test
rather than an absolutist, categorical test. Ely, supra note 9, at 233-34 n.27. For a
discussion of Buckley from within a Rawlsian constructivist framework, see infra text
accompanying notes 178-87.
96. Ely, supra note 9, at 116.
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theory of freedom of expression (which Ely acknowledges "helped"
him in formulating his own framework97) to mediate between Ely's
and Rawls's theories.
2. Scanlon's Theory of Freedom of Expression and Categories of
Expression
In his powerful and influential article, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression,98 Scanlon based his theory on a single, audience-related
principle that generalized Alexander Meiklejohn's famous theory of
free speech in relation to self-government99 beyond the category of
political speech to all categories of expression. 100 Scanlon termed this
principle the "Millian Principle":
There are certain harms which, although they would not occur but
for certain acts of expression, nonetheless cannot be taken as part of
a justification for legal restrictions on these acts. These harms are:
(a) harms to certain individuals which consist in their coming to
have false beliefs as a result of those acts of expression; (b) harmful
consequences of acts performed as a result of those acts of
expression, where the connection between the acts of expression
and the subsequent harmful acts consists merely in the fact that the
act of expression led the agents to believe (or increased their
tendency to believe) these acts to be worth performing. 0 1
Scanlon defended this Millian Principle by arguing that it was
entailed by an idea about the limits of legitimate governmental
authority: "that the legitimate powers of government are limited to
those that can be defended on grounds compatible with the autonomy
of its citizens-compatible, that is, with the idea that each citizen is
sovereign in deciding what to believe and in weighing reasons for
action. ' '""Q Scanlon suggested that this principle could be seen as "a
generalized version of Meiklejohn's idea of the political responsibility
of democratic citizens."0 3
Subsequently, Scanlon thoughtfully refined his theory in Freedom
of Expression and Categories of Expression. °4 There he revises his
notion of autonomy in a way that I shall invoke in sketching a
Rawlsian conception of securing the preconditions for the
development and exercise of the two moral powers in the two
fundamental cases. Scanlon initially employed the idea of autonomy
97. Id. at 231 n.15.
98. Scanlon, supra note 64.
99. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government
(1948), reprinted in Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 1 (1960).
100. Scanlon, Categories, supra note 65, at 530-31.
101. Scanlon, supra note 64, at 213.
102. Id. at 215.
103. Id.
104. Scanlon, Categories, supra note 65.
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"as a constraint on justifications of authority.' ' 15  He now invokes
autonomy, "understood as the actual ability to exercise independent
rational judgment, as a good to be promoted" 06-- for example,
through protecting the audience's central interest in expression,
namely, "the interest in having a good environment for the formation
of one's beliefs and desires."'0 7
Scanlon's initial sense of autonomy is echoed in Ely's theme of
democracy and distrust and consequent suspicion of governmental
suppression of expression that is rooted in a fear of how people will
react to the speaker's message.108 Scanlon still argues that "where
political issues are involved governments are notoriously partisan and
unreliable," and therefore that "giving government the authority to
make policy by balancing interests in such cases presents a serious
threat to particularly important participant and audience interests." ' 9
He suggests, however, that "the assumption that governments are
relatively neutral and trustworthy [in the area of commercial speech
as contrasted with the struggle between religious or political views] is
one reason for our complacent attitude toward regulation of
commercial speech."" 0
Hence, from the standpoint of distrust, Scanlon now argues that
"political speech stands out as a distinctively important category of
expression.'. 1  He suggests that "Meiklejohn's mistake... was to
suppose that the differences in degree between this category and
others mark the boundaries of first amendment theory.11 2 Scanlon
continues: "My mistake, on the other hand, was that in an effort to
generalize Meiklejohn's theory beyond the category of political
speech, I took what were in effect features peculiar to this category
and presented them, under the heading of autonomy, as a priori
constraints on justifications of legitimate authority. ''1 3
Scanlon now contends that the appeal of the idea of autonomy in
his first sense, that is, as an a priori constraint on justifications of
authority, derives entirely from the value of autonomy in his second
sense, that is, from the importance of promoting the audience's
central interests in freedom of expression. 4 He acknowledges that
105. Id. at 533.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 527.
108. See Ely, supra note 9, at 105-16.
109. Scanlon, Categories, supra note 65, at 534.
110. Id. at 541-42. Even so, Scanlon grants that "[t]here are many cases that clearly
count as commercial speech in which our traditional suspicions of governmental
regulation of expression are as fully justified as they are elsewhere"-particularly
where an advertising battle has a political element that raises the threat of partisan
governmental regulation. Id. at 542.
111. Id. at 535.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 534.
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"[t]o build these interests in at the outset as constraints on the process
of justification gives theoretical form to the intuition that freedom of
expression is based on considerations that cannot simply be
outweighed by competing interests in the manner that 'clear and
present danger' or 'pure balancing' theories of the first amendment
would allow." '115 "But," Scanlon continues, "to build these audience
interests into the theory in this way has the effect of assigning them
greater and more constant weight than we in fact give them.' 116
Furthermore, "it prevents us from even asking whether these interests
might in some cases be better advanced if we could shield ourselves
from some influences."1 7 Scanlon argues that "[i]n order to meet the
objections raised to the Millian Principle, it is necessary to answer
such questions, and, in general, to take account of the variations in
audience interests under varying circumstances." '  "But," he
concludes, "this is not possible within the framework of the argument
I advanced."'1 9
Nor is it possible within the framework that Ely advances (or, for
that matter, within the framework advanced by the Rehnquist Court).
For Ely insists upon rigorously maintaining the dichotomy between
absolutely protected and unprotected categories of messages. He
argues that "unless the expression in question falls into one of the
unprotected categories, it is fully protected against content-directed
regulation, irrespective of how it might measure up against other
protected expression."' 20 (We see similar moves in Scalia's opinion in
R.A.V.) 2' Ely wrote this statement in response to Justice John Paul
Stevens's call for a hierarchy of values protected by the First
Amendment and the latter's conclusion that "there is surely a less
vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the
borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the
free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance."'2
Beyond the ranking of categories of messages as absolutely protected
or unprotected, a hierarchy of values protected by the First
Amendment is anathema to Ely's theory of democracy and distrust
(just as it is anathema to Scalia's theory). But Ely's dichotomy-
important though it is to maintain in situations of likely political
distortion and judicial acquiescence-is strained, if not arbitrary,
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Ely, supra note 9, at 234 n.27.
121. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
122. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976); see also New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 777-81 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Schad v. Mt. Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 79-85 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544-48 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978).
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when applied to speech within traditionally unprotected categories of
messages that the Court has recently elevated to an intermediate level
of constitutional protection.
Ironically, Ely's aversion to, or suspicion of, the Court's
intermediate level of review of regulations of, or restrictions on,
commercial speech (marketplace ideas) might aggravate rather than
terminate the new era of Lochner ushered in by Buckley's
understanding of the First Amendment as a veritable marketplace of
ideas.123 The marketplace of marketplace ideas is not in need of
absolute protection by the Court. There is no reason especially to
distrust the outcomes of the political process that touch upon
commercial speech. But the Rehnquist Court, if forced to choose
between full protection and no protection for commercial speech,
most likely would choose full protection. Clearing the channels of
commercial promotion, however, is not a constitutional imperative on
the order of clearing the channels of political change. Commercial
speech ought not to be a category of absolutely protected messages,
though neither ought it to be a category of unprotected messages.
We need a theory that will attribute a subsidiary function to
protecting commercial speech, so as not to leave it untheorized and
therefore vulnerable to being incorporated into a notion of the
marketplace of marketplace ideas that harkens back to Lochner. And
we need a framework that can support an intermediate level of
review, so as not to degenerate into a sliding scale that slides down
into an amorphous balancing test. A Rawlsian constitutional
constructivism provides such a theory along with this sort of
framework.
3. A Rawlsian Framework of the Basic Liberties and Their Priority
Unlike Ely's two-track framework and Scanlon's first framework, it
is possible within a Rawlsian framework to take account of the
variations in the audience's interests in freedom of expression under
varying circumstances. Scanlon now argues that "[t]he central
audience interest in expression... is the interest in having a good
environment for the formation of one's beliefs and desires. 1 24
Similarly, Rawls's framework of the basic liberties and their priority is
concerned with securing the social conditions necessary for the
development and exercise of the two moral powers in the two
fundamental cases. The audience's interests in expression vary
depending upon the role and significance of the expression under
123. By "the new era of Lochner," I do not have in mind Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973). Instead, I refer to Buckley, insofar as the latter case
evinces an understanding of the First Amendment as a veritable "marketplace of
ideas." See infra text accompanying note 184.
124. Scanlon, Categories, supra note 65, at 527.
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consideration in relation to the application of these moral powers to
these fundamental cases.12 5
Rawls does not lay out a framework for analysis of the First
Amendment as such, because he is more concerned with freedom of
thought in relation to philosophical doctrine. Nonetheless, in outline,
the implications of his philosophical view for analysis of that
amendment are clear enough, both from his discussion of some of
these implications and from his references to several leading
constitutional theorists whose work bears affinities to his own.
Rawls argues that "[i]n understanding the priority of the basic
liberties we must distinguish between their restriction and their
regulation,"1 26 citing Tribe's application of this distinction in
formulating a two-track framework for analysis of the First
Amendment 127 along with Meiklejohn's distinction between rules
abridging the content of speech and rules of order that are essential
for regulating free discussion.128 Rawls also speaks more generally of
the distinction between restrictions on content and "reasonable
regulations relating to time and place, and the access to public
facilities, always on a footing of equality.' ' 129 Finally, Rawls relates his
arrangement of the basic liberties, which emphasizes the role of the
two fundamental cases and connects these cases with the two moral
powers, to Vincent Blasi's classification of the values protected by the
First Amendment under the headings of "individual autonomy,"
"diversity," "self-government," and "the checking value." 130
These references to leading constitutional theorists may help to
domesticate Rawls's philosophical view, to locate it on the terrain of
constitutional theory, and to put it to work in the context of the
bounded constitutional theorizing of the American constitutional
order. But these assurances of familiarity should not blind us to
possible novel contributions that Rawls's framework might make to
the analysis of our system of freedom of expression. These
contributions will come out most clearly through noting both the
similarities and differences between Rawls's and Meiklejohn's views.
Rawls acknowledges that his account of the basic liberties and their
125. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 331-40.
126. Id. at 295.
127. Id. at 295 n.11 (citing Tribe, supra note 62, § 12-2, at 789-94).
128. Id. at 296 n.12 (citing Meiklejohn, supra note 99).
129. Id. at 341; see also id. at 336 ("[T]here is no restriction on the content of
political speech, but only regulations as to time and place, and the means used to
express it.").
130. Id. at 335 n.45 (citing Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 521). What is more, Rawls acknowledges his
indebtedness to Harry Kalven, Jr.'s work on freedom of political speech in a free
society. Id. at 342-43 (citing Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment
(1966)); id. at 344 n.53 (citing Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of
Speech in America (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) [hereinafter Kalven, A Worthy
Tradition]).
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priority, when applied to the constitutional doctrine of a well-ordered
society, has a certain similarity to the well-known view of
Meiklejohn.13' Meiklejohn is well known for emphasizing the role of
free speech in relation to self-government, 13 2 and for arguing that the
First Amendment is an absolute as far as political speech is
concerned.133  Rawls, however, differentiates his account from
Meiklejohn's view along three lines:
First, the kind of primacy Meiklejohn gives to the political liberties
and to free speech is here given to the family of basic liberties as a
whole; second, the value of self-government, which for Meiklejohn
often seems overriding, is counted as but one important value
among others; and finally, the philosophical background of the basic
liberties is very different.3
These differences lead to broader conceptions of both protection and
regulation of political liberties and free speech as well as of the other
basic liberties in Rawls's constructivist framework.
Akin to Meiklejohn's idea of regulation of free speech, by analogy
to rules of order, to protect the system of self-government is Rawls's
notion of the mutual adjustment of basic liberties to secure a fully
adequate scheme of the whole family of basic liberties. As Rawls puts
it, because "the various basic liberties are bound to conflict with one
another, the institutional rules which define these liberties must be
adjusted so that they fit into a coherent scheme of liberties." '135 With
this in mind, he concedes that "[t]he public use of our reason must be
regulated [as distinguished from restricted]." '136 But he argues that
"the priority of liberty requires this [regulation] to be done, so far as
possible, to preserve intact the central range of application of each
basic liberty."'37  And he contends that "It]he priority of these
liberties is not infringed when they are merely regulated, as they must
be, in order to be combined into one scheme as well as adapted to
certain social conditions necessary for their enduring exercise." '38
Notwithstanding this regulation or mutual adjustment of the basic
liberties, Rawls's framework entails a form of absolutism. For "the
priority of liberty means that the first principle of justice assigns the
basic liberties, as given by a list, a special status":13 9 "They have an
absolute weight with respect to reasons of [utilitarian] public good
and of perfectionist values"; 4° and, for that matter, they have priority
131. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 290 n.1.
132. Meiklejohn, supra note 99.
133. Meiklejohn, supra note 56.
134. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 290 n.1.
135. Id. at 295.
136. Id. at 296.
137. Id. (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 295.
139. Id. at 294.
140. Id. at 294 & n.10.
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over the second principle of justice.'4 ' Hence, "[t]he priority of liberty
implies in practice that a basic liberty can be limited or denied solely
for the sake of one or more other basic liberties, and never.., for
reasons of [utilitarian] public good or of perfectionist values. 142
Rawls urges that "[ilt should be noted that the mutual adjustment
of the basic liberties is justified on grounds allowed by the priority of
these liberties as a family, no one of which is in itself absolute."'4
This kind of adjustment, he contends, "is markedly different from a
general balancing of interests which permits considerations of all
kinds-political, economic, and social-to restrict these liberties, even
regarding their content, when the advantages gained or injuries
avoided are thought to be great enough." 1" He explains: "In justice
as fairness the adjustment of the basic liberties [so as to preserve
intact the central range of application of each basic liberty145] is
grounded solely on their significance as specified by their role in the
two fundamental cases, and this adjustment is guided by the aim of
specifying a fully adequate scheme of these liberties. 146
The notion of balancing may be weak and truistic-as a metaphor
for judgment, which in any event is necessary and so makes the notion
trivial.'47 Or it may be strong and corrosive-as a mode of utilitarian
cost-benefit calculations along the lines of Judge Learned Hand's
formula for negligence;"' or his "gravity of the evil" test as a
formulation of the clear and present danger test; 149 or Justice
Frankfurter's mode of ad hoc evaluations of specific threats --none
of which takes rights seriously. Rawls's notion of the priority of the
basic liberties demands that these liberties be taken seriously.
Hence, a Rawlsian constitutional constructivism shares Ely's
141. Id. at 299.
142. Id. at 295.
143. Id. at 358.
144. Id. at 358-59.
145. Id. at 296.
146. Id. at 358-59.
147. See Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
Colum. L. Rev. 1022 (1978) (distinguishing between "balancing as interpretation" and
"balancing as doctrine").
148. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand,
J.).
149. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.). In
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson,
writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court, adopted Hand's formulation of the clear
and present danger test as a gravity of the evil test, which itself is an adaptation of
Hand's formula for negligence. This test in effect waters down the "clear and present
danger" test (famously articulated in Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927)) to the remote bad tendency test articulated in
Justice Sanford's majority opinion in Whitney. See id. at 646-47, overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); Kalven, A Worthy Tradition, supra
note 130, at 198.
150. See Ely, supra note 9, at 108-09 (criticizing Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 517-61).
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aversion to balancing on both his absolutist, categorical track and his
less restrictive alternative, specific harm track for analysis of the First
Amendment. But Rawls's notion of mutual adjustment within the
family of basic liberties, in terms of the role and significance of a
particular liberty for the free public use of our reason in the two
fundamental cases, may appear to smack of a hierarchy of values.
Indeed, there is an affinity between Rawls's scheme and Justice
Stevens's call for a hierarchy of values and hankering to break out of a
two-track analytical framework."' A Rawlsian constructivist
framework might well answer that call and satisfy that hankering. We
need to break out of a two-track framework, so long as it views the
First Amendment in isolation from the scheme of basic liberties as a
whole. But we need to remain within a constructivist framework and
hence not tolerate limitations on basic liberties for the sake of
pursuing utilitarian public good or imposing perfectionist values.
That is, the ordering of constitutional values must take place within
the constraints of the priority of a fully adequate scheme of basic
liberties. This ordering must not be permitted to degenerate into an
amorphous balancing of values irrespective of their status in relation
to such a scheme.
For a Rawlsian constitutional constructivism, the problem with
cases striking down regulations of the financing of electoral campaigns
and referenda, such as Buckley and First National Bank, is not, pace
Ely, that the Court strayed off an absolutist, categorical track onto the
slippery slope of a test that is merely "a more demanding sort of
balancing or specific harm test."'52 Rather, the problem is that the
Court failed to see the Constitution as a whole, and therefore failed to
see that freedom of political expression may be regulated (though not
restricted) in order to guarantee the fair value of the equal political
liberties.153 Justice Byron R. White, dissenting in both Buckley and
First National Bank, recognized that freedom of political expression
was being regulated for the sake of protecting a system of freedom of
expression and that in this sense there were compelling governmental
interests in regulation rooted in the First Amendment itself.1 4
Neither absolutism nor balancing, but an intermediate level of
review, is in order for such instances of adjustment of one basic liberty
151. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 423 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319-24 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); and opinions of Stevens cited supra note 122.
152. See Ely, supra note 9, at 115, 233-34 n.27.
153. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 362.
154. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803-04 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 257-66 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting). Rawls indicates that his discussion is in sympathy with White's dissenting
opinions in both First National Bank and Buckley. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra
note 1, at 359 n.72.
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to another. 155 For it is the family of basic liberties, not one basic
liberty in particular, that has absolute weight with respect to the
balancing of utilitarian public good and the imposition of perfectionist
values. And there can be no more compelling governmental interest
than securing a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties for all
citizens in order to afford for everyone the common and guaranteed
status of equal citizenship.
Commercial speech should receive merely intermediate protection
for a different reason, which illustrates another rung in a constructivist
framework's hierarchy of values protected by the First Amendment.
The category of commercial speech does not bring into play the equal
basic liberties of Rawls's first principle of justice in the first place; it
instead involves the exercise of (non-basic) liberties associated with
his second principle of justice."5 6 However important the latter
liberties may be, they do not have the role and significance in relation
to the development and exercise of the moral powers in either or both
of the fundamental cases that is requisite for absolutist, categorical
protection.
Accordingly, a Rawlsian constitutional constructivism would allow
the marketplace of marketplace ideas to be regulated and indeed
restricted in order to promote important and compelling
governmental interests that would be illegitimate or inapposite with
regard to the category of political expression-for example,
prohibition of false or misleading advertising.'57 At the same time,
such a theory would recognize that some kinds of commercial speech
ought not to be wholly unprotected-for example, advertising
containing information about prices and the features of products that
knowledgeable purchasers use as criteria of evaluation, which has a
role to play in the functioning of a workably competitive and efficient
market.58
Hence, a Rawlsian constitutional constructivism would entail an
intermediate level of review that is sensitive to variations in the
audience's interests in expression under varying circumstances for the
category of commercial speech.'59  In cases following Virginia
155. Rawls suggests that arrangements to secure the fair value of the equal political
liberties are compatible with the central range of free political speech and press as a
basic liberty, provided that the following three conditions hold:
First, there are no restrictions on the content of speech .... A second
condition is that the instituted arrangements must not impose any undue
burdens on the various political groups in society and must affect them all in
an equitable manner.... Finally, the various regulations of political speech
must be rationally designed to achieve the fair value of the political liberties.
Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 357-58.
156. Id. at 357, 363.
157, Id. at 364.
158. Id.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 106-19 (discussing Scanlon's view).
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Pharmacy,"6 such as Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 6 the Court has developed a "four-step
analysis," analogous to the less restrictive alternative analysis of
O'Brien, that well fits this specification-provided that it is
recognized, as Justice Stevens urges in his concurring opinion in
Central Hudson, that "[b]ecause 'commercial speech' is afforded less
constitutional protection than other forms of speech, it is important
that the commercial speech concept not be defined too broadly lest
speech deserving of greater constitutional protection be inadvertently
suppressed. 162
Finally, American Mini Theatres, which upheld a zoning regulation
of "adult motion picture theaters" and "adult book stores," even if
their fare were not obscene and therefore unprotected expression, 16 is
defensible within the scheme of a Rawlsian constitutional
constructivism. "Adult" expression may well have a role and
significance in some persons' pursuits of their conceptions of the
good, but the central range of application of these persons' two moral
powers in the two fundamental cases is secured as long as these sorts
of materials are readily available to them-as such materials
concededly were in Detroit in American Mini Theatres."6 Besides this
audience's interest in the availability of such expression, there is the
further interest of bystanders in not being unwillingly exposed to
material that they find offensive. A zoning regulation may represent
a fair sharing of inconvenience between consenting audiences of
adults and unconsenting bystanders and children.165 Where political
expression is concerned, however, the First Amendment requires
unwilling bystanders to absorb the "first blow" of protected speech
that they find offensive.166
In assessing Ely's and the Rehnquist Court's two-track frameworks
for First Amendment analysis, we should bear in mind Rawls's
suggestion concerning the priority of the basic liberties:
It is wise, I think, to limit the basic liberties to those that are truly
essential .... The reason for this limit on the list of basic liberties is
the special status of these liberties. Whenever we enlarge the list of
160. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 92-95 and note 95.
161. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see supra note 95.
162. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
163. 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976).
164. In the portion of his opinion of the Court joined only by a plurality, Justice
Stevens suggested that "[t]he situation would be quite different if the ordinance had
the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech." Id. at 71 n.35.
165. See Scanlon, Categories, supra note 65, at 542. But see id. at 545-46 (suggesting
that "if what the partisans of pornography are entitled to (and what the restrictors are
trying to deny them) is a fair opportunity to influence the sexual mores of the society,
then it seems that they, like participants in political speech in the narrow sense, are
entitled to at least a certain degree of access even to unwilling audiences").
166. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 759 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971).
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basic liberties we risk weakening the protection of the most essential
ones and recreating within the scheme of liberties the indeterminate
and unguided balancing problems we had hoped to avoid by a
suitably circumscribed notion of priority.'
67
Ely's and the Court's two tracks, on the one hand, may provide an
inadequate ordering of constitutional values, but too many gradations,
on the other, may degenerate into a sliding scale or an unguided
balancing test that does not take seriously the priority of the basic
liberties. A Rawlsian constructivist framework lies between two
tracks and too many gradations. As such, it may help to determine a
structure for, or the rungs in, the hierarchy of values protected by the
First Amendment. In this section, I have attempted merely to give a
preliminary (and incomplete) sketch of the hierarchy entailed by a
Rawlsian constitutional constructivism.
C. Guaranteeing the Fair Value of the Equal Political Liberties
Rawls states that "[w]hen we... consider the distinctive role of the
political process in determining the laws and policies to regulate the
basic structure, it is not implausible that [the equal political liberties]
alone should receive the special guarantee of fair value.""16  "This
guarantee," he argues, "is a natural focal point between merely formal
liberty on the one side and some kind of wider guarantee [of fair
value] for all basic liberties on the other., 169
Rawls distinguishes between merely formal basic liberties and the
fair value of these liberties, or between liberty and the worth of
liberty, as follows:
[T]he basic liberties are specified by institutional rights and duties
that entitle citizens to do various things, if they wish, and that forbid
others to interfere. The basic liberties are a framework of legally
protected paths and opportunities. Of course, ignorance and
poverty, and the lack of material means generally, prevent people
from exercising their rights and from taking advantage of these
openings. But rather than counting these and similar obstacles as
restricting a person's liberty, we count them as affecting the worth of
liberty, that is, the usefulness to persons of their liberties.
170
167. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 296.
168. Id. at 328-29.
169. Id. at 329.
170. Id. at 325-26; see also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 18, § 32, at 204-
05. As noted above, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls argues that a liberal political
conception of justice, and a reasonably just constitutional democracy, must assure
"sufficient all-purpose means to enable all citizens to make intelligent and effective
use of their freedoms." See Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 27, at 49. He
mentions five kinds of institutions or arrangements that are necessary to prevent
"social and economic inequalities from becoming excessive" and to achieve stability:
(a) "[a] certain fair equality of opportunity"; (b) "[a] decent distribution of income
and wealth"; (c) "[s]ociety as employer of last resort"; (d) "[b]asic health care assured
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He treats the equal political liberties in a special way: "by including in
the first principle of justice the guarantee that the political liberties,
and only these liberties, are secured by [affording] their 'fair
value.'
, 171
Rawls explains that "this guarantee means that the worth of the
political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or economic
position, must be approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in
the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office
and to influence the outcome of political decisions." 172 The guarantee
has two noteworthy features:
First, it secures for each citizen a fair and roughly equal access to the
use of a public facility designed to serve a definite political purpose,
namely, the public facility specified by the constitutional rules and
procedures which govern the political process and control the entry
to positions of political authority.... [Tihese rules and procedures
are to be a fair process, designed to yield just and effective
legislation.17
3
He continues:
Second, this public facility has limited space, so to speak. Hence,
those with relatively greater means can combine together and
exclude those who have less in the absence of the guarantee of fair
value of the political liberties.... Certainly, in the absence of the
second principle of justice [which is not incorporated into the
constitution], the outcome is a foregone conclusion; for the limited
space of the political process has the consequence that the
usefulness of our political liberties is far more subject to our social
position and our place in the distribution of income and wealth than
the usefulness of our other basic liberties. 74
"The point to note" concerning the limited "public space" of this
governmentally established and maintained public facility, Rawls
observes, "is that the valid claims of equal citizens are held within
certain standard limits by the notion of a fair and equal access to the
political process as a public facility. 17' The guarantee of fair value for
the equal political liberties is thus analogous to Meiklejohn's notion of
rules of order essential for regulating free discussion in a system of
self-government. 76
Rawls admits that "[i]t is beyond the scope of a philosophical
doctrine to consider in any detail the kinds of arrangements required
for all citizens"; and (e) "[plublic financing of elections and ways of assuring the
availability of public information on matters of policy." Id. at 49, 50.
171. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 327; see also Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, supra note 18, § 40, at 224-27, § 41, at 233-34, § 49, at 277-79, § 62, at 356.
172. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 327.
173. Id. at 328.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Meiklejohn, supra note 99.
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to insure the fair value of the equal political liberties."' 177 Nonetheless,
he illustrates the problem of maintaining the fair value of the equal
political liberties by considering regulations of the financing of
electoral campaigns and referenda of the sort struck down in Buckley
v. Valeo'78 and First National Bank v. Bellotti.17 He argues that these
regulations "were admissible attempts to achieve the aim of a fair
scheme of representation in which all citizens could have a more full
and effective voice." ' From Wesberry v. Sanders8' and Reynolds v.
Sims,'82 which had affirmed the principle of one person, one vote,
Rawls infers that the right to vote that is protected under the
American Constitution involves more than the right simply to cast a
vote which is counted equally: "[W]hat is fundamental is a political
procedure which secures for all citizens a full and equally effective
voice in a fair scheme of representation. Such a scheme is
fundamental because the adequate protection of other basic rights
depends on it. Formal equality is not enough."' 83 Accordingly, he
argues:
If the Court means what it says in Wesberry and Reynolds, Buckley
must sooner or later give way. The First Amendment no more
enjoins a system of representation according to influence effectively
exerted in free political rivalry between unequals than the
Fourteenth Amendment enjoins a system of liberty of contract and
free competition between unequals in the economy, as the Court
thought in the Lochner era.
184
As against Rawls's understanding of the principle of equal
participation, the Court in Buckley thus appears to have embraced a
notion of the veritable marketplace of ideas: a marketplace in which
ideas and candidates are bought and sold.
Furthermore, in saying that "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment,' 8 5 the Court in Buckley seems to have rejected the idea
that Congress may try to guarantee the fair value of the equal political
liberties. In doing so, Rawls argues, the Court is failing to see the
177. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 327. He acknowledges that
"[h]ow best to proceed is a complex and difficult matter," but he suggests that "one
guideline for guaranteeing fair value seems to be to keep political parties independent
of large concentrations of private economic and social power in a private-property
democracy, and of government control and bureaucratic power in a liberal socialist
regime." Id. at 328.
178. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
179. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
180. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 362.
181. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
182. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
183. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 361.
184. Id. at 362.
185. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
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Constitution as a whole.'86 It is failing to recognize that freedom of
political speech and the equal political liberties, as members of the
family of equal basic liberties, may be adjusted to one another in
order to guarantee the central range of application of these liberties in
the first fundamental case. The Court is also failing to see that
securing the fair value of the equal political liberties is arguably
justifiable on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause together with
the Republican Form of Government Clause.187 Rawls's critique of
Buckley (and Bellotti) is an exemplar of how to think about securing
equal protection or equal participation together with freedom of
expression, or securing the central range of application of both
freedom of expression and equal participation rather than privileging
the former to the exclusion of the other.
III. THE PRIORITY OF THE FAMILY OF BASIC LIBERTIES: TAKING
BOTH EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
SERIOUSLY
A. The Priority of the Basic Liberties, or Taking Rights Seriously
Liberal theorists of freedom of expression and the Supreme Court
alike have gotten on the bandwagon of First Amendment absolutism
and taking freedom of expression seriously. In doing so, they have
ignored or erased concern for securing equal citizenship for all. We
need to reflect more on not only taking freedom of expression
seriously, but also taking equality seriously. Or, to translate an
argument made by my colleague Russell Robinson: (1) the First
Amendment absolutists have taken the First Amendment too
seriously (to the exclusion of concern for equal protection); (2) the
progressives and critical race theorists have taken the Equal
Protection Clause too seriously (to the exclusion of concern for
freedom of expression); and (3) we need a framework that does not
take either too seriously but takes each seriously enough and in the
right way. 188
It should come as no surprise that in a world where First
Amendment absolutism is familiar and established (and with it, taking
freedom of expression seriously), yet Equal Protection absolutism is
not (and with it, taking equal citizenship seriously), we have decisions
like Buckley, R.A. V., and Boy Scouts. The problem with each of these
cases is similar: (1) failing (or refusing) to see the Constitution as a
186. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 362.
187. Cf. Ely, supra note 9, at 122 (arguing that his account of the principle of "one
person, one vote" is best justified as "the joint product of the Equal Protection and
Republican Form [of Government] Clauses").
188. See Russell K. Robinson, Boy Scouts & Burning Crosses: Bringing Balance to
the Court's Lopsided Approach to the Intersection of Equality and Speech
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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whole, and thus overemphasizing the commitment to freedom of
expression or association; and (2) failing (or refusing) to honor the
commitment to securing equal citizenship for all. We need to figure
out ways to take freedom of expression and equal protection seriously
at once, at least to the extent of securing the core or central range of
application of each. Yet we also need to rethink how to do this in
order (1) to avoid absolutism of one or the other as well as (2) to
avoid sliding into the morass of balancing generally. We need an
architecture or structure of basic liberties that promises to secure the
central range of application of both and also to avert such a slide.
Here I suggest that a Rawlsian guiding framework, sketched above,
might provide such an architecture or structure, and might help frame
our judgments regarding what to do when concern to protect freedom
of expression and concern to secure equal citizenship clash. Within
this framework, again, we accord priority to the whole family of basic
liberties over utilitarian and perfectionist conceptions of general
welfare or common good-not priority to any particular basic liberty
over others. Furthermore, Rawls develops the idea that according
priority to the whole family of basic liberties does not preclude
regulating or adjusting one basic liberty to secure another, for we may
need to regulate or adjust one basic liberty to secure the central range
of application of another. This adjustment may be acceptable so long
as we secure the central range of application of the former basic
liberty, for again, we are seeking to give priority to the whole family
of basic liberties, not to pursue an absolutism of particular liberties.
But note that this idea does not open the door generally to balancing
of rights against governmental interests: The only permissible type of
regulating or adjusting of one basic liberty is to secure another basic
liberty, not to pursue utilitarian or perfectionist conceptions of
general interest, common good, or other ends.
As shown above, Rawls himself applies this guiding framework to
Buckley. I shall sketch how it might apply to Roberts, R.A.V., and
Boy Scouts. I want to make clear that my aim is not to offer new
interpretations of these cases, or even to resolve them; rather, it is to
illustrate how we might grapple with these cases through deploying a
guiding framework inspired by Rawls's analysis. Throughout, my aim
is architectural: to illustrate how we might use the guiding framework
to structure the inquiry in such cases. I should add that my aim is to
elaborate a Rawlsian guiding framework, not to explicate Rawls's own
views. 189
189. Cf John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory (1980), reprinted in
John Rawls: Collected Papers 303-05 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) (distinguishing
between his own "Kantian" view and "Kant's view").
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1. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul
As argued above, Buckley was wrongly decided with respect to
limitations on campaign expenditures, among other reasons, because
the Court failed to see the Constitution as a whole. Therefore, it
failed to see that freedom of political expression may be regulated
(though not restricted) through campaign finance laws in order to try
to assure political equality, or the fair value of the equal political
liberties, for equal citizens in a fair scheme of representation. The
Court's single-minded focus on the First Amendment without regard
to such preconditions for deliberative democracy blinded it to that
compelling governmental objective.
A similar blindness may be at work in Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Court in R.A.V.,1 9° which struck down a "Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance." Scalia and the Court resolutely refused to see the
Constitution as a whole and therefore failed to see that freedom of
hateful racist expression quite possibly may be regulated (though not
restricted) in order to attempt to secure equal citizenship for members
of groups who are subject to racial, religious, gender, or sexual
orientation hostility (this equality too, is a precondition for
deliberative democracy).'
190. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
191. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 124, 151-60 (1992) (criticizing the Court for ignoring the
Reconstruction Amendments). But see Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A
Penumbra Too Far, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1639, 1657 (1993) (arguing, in response to
Amar, supra, that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are "missing" from
R.A.V. because "penumbras and emanations are dangerous business," and these
provisions' "shadows" are "too tenuous" or "too far" from the First Amendment to
be brought to bear on the case).
Scanlon writes of ordinances like that at issue in R.A.V.: "But the proposed
restrictions would restrict speech on the basis of its content, in violation of one of the
limitations that Rawls placed on the regulation of campaign finances. This quandary
raises the question of whether Rawls should regard this kind of regulation as an
impermissible restriction." Scanlon, supra note 58, at 1485. Scanlon's formulation
here implies that he accepts Scalia's view that the ordinance was discriminatory,
whereas I accept Stevens's view that it was evenhanded. In arguing that the
ordinance imposed a "viewpoint discrimination" in favor of proponents of racial
tolerance and equality, Scalia writes: "St. Paul has no such authority to license one
side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensbury rules." R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392. Stevens retorted:
The St. Paul ordinance is evenhanded. In a battle between advocates of
tolerance and advocates of intolerance, the ordinance does not prevent
either side from hurling fighting words at the other on the basis of their
conflicting ideas, but it does bar both sides from hurling such words on the
basis of the target's "race, color, creed, religion or gender." To extend the
Court's pugilistic metaphor, the St. Paul ordinance simply bans punches
"below the belt"-by either party. It does not, therefore, favor one side of
any debate.
Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring). In any case, I noted above that my aim is to
develop a Rawlsian framework, not to explicate Rawls's own views. See supra text
accompanying note 189.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
My suggestion regarding what is wrong with Scalia's opinion
accords with that of Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in
R.A.V. Stevens argues that the First Amendment-in isolation from
the whole scheme-is not an absolute. 92 Justice White made a similar
argument in R.A. V., mentioning the Equal Protection Clause and
stating that "[i]n light of our Nation's long and painful experience
with discrimination," the ordinance was plainly reasonable and the
interest compelling. 193
I suspect that even if the Rehnquist Court did see the Constitution
as a whole-if it did look at the Equal Protection Clause as well as the
First Amendment-it still would come out the same way. Indeed,
Scalia officially credits (or pays lip service to) protecting racial
minorities as a compelling governmental interest.'94 He proceeds to
give short shrift to this point, though, concluding that the ordinance
does not survive strict scrutiny, for there were less restrictive
alternatives available, such as prosecution under trespass, arson, and
similar statutes.'95 White objects that Scalia gives new meaning to
strict scrutiny. 196 More importantly, trespass, arson, and the like-the
less restrictive alternatives Scalia vaunts-are not less restrictive
means to the same end. The aim is not merely to protect the private
property of African-American families. It is publicly to affirm their
status as equal citizens. Trespass, arson, and other statutes simply are
not means to furthering that end.
Scalia might object that the government affirming the equal
citizenship of African-Americans over and against racists' views of
their inferiority is "thought control" or a move that will put us on the
slippery slope toward totalitarianism, just as Judge Frank Easterbrook
objected in the context of the government affirming the equal
192. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 421-23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 407 (White, J., concurring). It is not clear to what extent Virginia v.
Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003), has narrowed R.A.V. There, the Court held 6-3 that
states may make it a crime to burn a cross with a purpose to intimidate, provided that
the law clearly puts the burden on prosecutors to prove that the act was intended as a
threat and not as a form of symbolic expression. Id. at 1550-52. The Court, however,
held that the Virginia statute at issue was unconstitutional. Id. at 1552. In Black,
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court said that "[a] ban on cross burning carried
out with the intent to intimidate is fully consistent with our holding in R.A.V and is
proscribable under the First Amendment." Id. at 1550. Notably, the arguments in
support of the constitutionality of such laws in the case did not emphasize the concern
for securing equal citizenship for African-Americans so much as the idea that threats
with intent to intimidate are not speech. For example, Justice Thomas argued that
the statute addressed only conduct, not speech, and so "there is no need to analyze it
under any of our First Amendment tests." Id. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He
argued that the message of cross burning is terror and intimidation that does not
qualify as protected expression. Id. at 1564-66.
194. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395.
195. Id. at 380 n.1, 395-96.
196. Id. at 403-04 (White, J., concurring).
[Vol. 721468
2004] SECURING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 1469
citizenship of women in regulating pornography. 97 Such arguments
are terribly overblown. Consider Canada's approaches to hate
speech1 98 and indeed to pornography, 99 which are at odds with those
in R.A.V. and American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut 00 Last time I
checked, Canada had not fallen down the slippery slope into
totalitarianism regarding hate speech or, for that matter,
pornography.0 1
I recognize that there may be pragmatic arguments against adopting
ordinances or statutes like those at issue in R.A.V. Recall Justice
Black's argument in dissent in Beauharnais about the Pyrrhic
victory-"Another such victory and I am undone"-of racial
minorities in winning a decision protecting them against hate speech
(and recall that the majority opinion in that case was written by
Justice Frankfurter, the balancer par excellence). 2° And perhaps it is
better not to make martyrs of racists, but to have their views out in
the open to be combated; such concerns are generally put forward in
safety valve arguments for protecting their freedom of speech. More
generally, perhaps it is better not to fan the flames of conservative
worries about "political correctness," worries that Justice Blackmun
suggested animated Scalia's opinion for the Court in R.A.V. 20 3 Still, it
197. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985), affd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
198. The Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, sustained an anti-hate speech law
very much like St. Paul's. Amendments to Canada's constitutional text adopted in
1982 included Section 2: "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms ... (b)
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press
and other media of communication." Can. Const. pt. I, § 2 (Constitution Act, 1982)
(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). Still, a close 4-3 majority reasoned that
the law was constitutional because it furthered democratic principles and because
racial, ethnic, or religious slurs were not essential to the purposes of free expression.
In stark contrast to Scalia's opinion, Chief Justice Dickson stated for the majority:
"While we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity,
it is equally destructive of free expression values, as well as those other values which
underlie a free and democratic society, to treat all expression as equally crucial to
those principles at the core of s. 2(b)." Id. at 760.
199. Butler v. The Queen, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, while acknowledging that Canada's
criminal obscenity law restricted freedom of expression, upheld the law on the ground
that it was justifiable to ban pornography that harms women. The decision redefined
pornography as sexually explicit material that involves violence or degradation. Id. at
485. In explicitly accepting the argument that pornography harms women, the Court
stated: "[I]f true equality between male and female persons is to be achieved, we
cannot ignore the threat to equality resulting from exposure to audiences of certain
types of violent and degrading material." Id. at 497.
200. 771 F.2d at 323.
201. It is another matter whether Canada's approaches have been effective at
moderating hate speech or pornography. Scanlon expresses reservations on this
score. Scanlon, supra note 58, at 1485.
202. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
203. 505 U.S. 377, 415-16 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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is good to answer and combat the R.A.V. conception of the First
Amendment itself.2°4
2. Roberts v. United States Jaycees
The Supreme Court's decision in Roberts25 is decidedly different
from Buckley in that in the former, unlike the latter, the Court did not
view it as "wholly foreign" to regulate freedom of association
protected by the First Amendment on the basis of concern for equal
protection. Roberts held that men's rights to associate with one
another (and not to associate with women) in a commercial and civic
organization were overridden by women's rights not to be
discriminated against in places of public accommodation.0 6 The case
held that the state of Minnesota had a compelling governmental
interest in eliminating gender discrimination in public
accommodations.2 °7
A Rawlsian constitutional constructivism should readily embrace
such a holding as necessary to secure for women and men alike the
common and guaranteed status of equal citizenship (also a
precondition for deliberative democracy). It bears noting that the
case, in distinguishing between freedom of expressive association and
freedom of intimate association,0 8  suggests that freedom of
association comes into play with respect to both moral powers in both
fundamental cases, both deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy.
What might account for the difference between Roberts and
Buckley? One, freedom of association in particular just may not be as
strong a right as freedom of expression in general-just not as
sheltered from governmental regulation. Two, freedom of association
in the commercial context at any rate is not as strong as freedom of
expression in the political context. Recall the earlier discussion about
commercial expression as a non-basic liberty. 2°9 And note that Justice
O'Connor, concurring in Roberts, argued that commercial association
does not warrant the stringent protection given to "expressive
association"; the former is subject to reasonable regulations. 210 Three,
perhaps the concern for equal protection in Roberts was better
204. For thoughtful efforts to do so, see, for example, Steven J. Heyman, Righting
the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression,
78 B.U. L. Rev. 1275 (1998); Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the
Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill
Rts. J. 647 (2002); Robinson, supra note 188.
205. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
206. Id. at 626-27.
207. Id. at 625-26.
208. Id. at 617-22.
209. See supra text accompanying note 156.
210. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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defined or at any rate more bounded than that in Buckley: The state
of Minnesota was simply trying to afford to women what was already
available to men, and therefore there was no potentially complicated
question such as how much expression is essential to secure equal
participation or a fully effective voice in the political process and the
like.
Roberts illustrates how the guiding framework sketched above
might work in a situation involving a choice between freedom of
expressive association and equal protection for women. Notably, the
Court did not simply say, freedom of association is well nigh absolute,
and that it is "wholly foreign"2"' or "thought control" '12 for
government to take measures that express the view that women are
equal citizens. Nor did Brennan's opinion for the Court in Roberts do
what Rehnquist's opinion for the Court subsequently did in Boy
Scouts: simply defer to the Jaycees' claims that being forced to admit
women would impair their expression or impede their ability to
disseminate their views or message."z 3 Instead, the Court recognized
that the state was furthering a compelling governmental interest and
that it was doing so through "the least restrictive means of achieving
its ends." '14 At the same time, the Court gave due regard to the
claims to freedom of association. It concluded that "the Jaycees has
failed to demonstrate that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the
male members' freedom of expressive association." '215 In particular,
the Court held that there was "no basis in the record for concluding
that admission of women as full voting members will impede the
organization's ability to engage in these protected activities or to
disseminate its preferred views." '216 We should treat Roberts as an
exemplar of how the Court might frame clashes between freedom of
association and equal protection and of how it might aim to secure the
core or central range of application of both freedom of association
and equal protection rather than privileging the former to the
exclusion of the latter.
At the same time, I should acknowledge that some liberals see
Roberts as undermining pluralism. For example, Nancy Rosenblum
and William Galston see it as enforcing "congruence" between
democratic values and the values of associations in civil society. 17
They argue against the appropriateness of governmental intervention
211. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
212. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985), affd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
213. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
214. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 627.
217. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of
Pluralism in America 158-76 (1998); William A. Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue,
and Liberal Democracy, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 603, 604-05 (2000).
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to enforce gender equality throughout civil society. But it is certainly
possible to believe that Roberts was rightly decided as a matter of
constitutional law on the ground that prohibiting gender
discrimination in "places of public accommodation" like the Jaycees is
a compelling governmental interest without thinking that it is
appropriate for the government to intervene to enforce gender
equality throughout civil society. For one thing, most institutions in
civil society are not "public accommodations" as a matter of
constitutional law and therefore are beyond the reach of the Roberts
decision. For another, it is appropriate and justifiable in some
circumstances for the government to regulate freedom of association
in order to attempt to secure equal citizenship for all, including
women and racial minorities. Rosenblum herself has acknowledged
that the workplace is an important exception to the autonomy of
group life and has fully endorsed, for example, Title VII.218 And so, to
reject Rosenblum's conclusion regarding Roberts is not necessarily to
reject her overall position regarding "the logic of congruence. "219
3. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
The Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America held that it
would violate the Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association to
require them to admit homosexuals because doing so would
"materially interfere with the ideas that the organization sought to
express. "220 I would argue that Boy Scouts was wrongly decided. It
should have followed the example of Roberts, and upheld New
Jersey's attempt to regulate freedom of association in order to further
the compelling governmental interest of prohibiting discrimination in
public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation. (New
Jersey law listed sexual orientation along with race and gender as
prohibited bases of discrimination.) 221 Doing so would have realized a
better adjustment of the basic values of concern for freedom of
expression and concern for equal citizenship of homosexuals.
What might account for the different outcomes in Roberts and Boy
Scouts? First, one might argue that there is a difference in the
character of the freedom of association: that the Jaycees were
engaged in commercial association, while the Boy Scouts were
involved in civic association; or that the Boy Scouts really were trying
218. See Rosenblum, supra note 217, at 163-64; Nancy L. Rosenblum, Compelled
Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in
Freedom of Association 75, 80, 85 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
219. Linda McClain and I have pursued such issues. Linda C. McClain & James E.
Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 301
(2000).
220. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000).
221. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-5 (West 2002); see also Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at
645, 661-62.
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to communicate a message about moral straightness that required
exclusion of homosexuals, whereas the Jaycees had no such message
that required exclusion of women. But in Roberts, what if the male
Jaycees had said that their message was not simply that "commerce is
good," but that "commerce by men is good, and commerce by women
is bad, because men by nature belong in the marketplace, and women
by nature belong in the home"? The Court's reasoning in Boy Scouts
suggests that the male Jaycees should have prevailed on the ground
that forcing them to admit women would "materially interfere with
the ideas that the organization sought to express." '222
Second, one might argue that there is a difference in the
governmental interests that could be invoked to justify the regulation
of freedom of association in those two cases. The majority opinion in
Boy Scouts states that "[w]e recognized in cases such as Roberts...
that States have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women in public accommodations."2"3 But in Boy Scouts, the
legislature and Supreme Court of New Jersey implicitly had adopted
the view that the State had a compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public
accommodations. The United States Supreme Court's decision
implicitly rejects this view. It either fails to recognize that view or
conclusorily dismisses it. Even if the Court were not ready to go all
the way with Roberts and hold that a compelling governmental
interest is present in Boy Scouts, it should have taken at least a few
steps in that direction, given its decision in Romer v. Evans2 4 and now
Lawrence v. Texas.225 These two cases hold (1) that governmental
measures reflecting animus against a politically unpopular group like
homosexuals do not constitute legitimate governmental interests.226
And they also suggest (2) that government may not take measures
that "demean" the lives of homosexual persons.227 Together, these
cases manifest some concern for the status of gays and lesbians as free
and equal citizens. 28  Therefore, in adjusting the clash between
concern for freedom of association and concern for equal citizenship
of homosexuals, the Court should have recognized the latter as a
more substantial concern than it did.
Now of course this Court might say that those two cases are
different because Boy Scouts involved diversity within civil society,
and freedom not to associate has greater force there than when
government has passed laws relating to homosexual sexual conduct or
222. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 657.
223. Id.
224. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
225. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
226. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626-31; Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
227. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
228. See James E. Fleming, Lawrence's Republic, 39 Tulsa L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
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to homosexuals' status in the community (as was the case in Lawrence
and Romer). Fair enough. But under New Jersey Law, the Boy
Scouts constitute a "public accommodation," just as under Minnesota
Law the Jaycees do. So the difference between Roberts and Boy
Scouts could come down to the difference between the Court's view of
the interest in eradicating gender discrimination and that in
eradicating sexual orientation discrimination.
We should acknowledge that had it been the Jaycees rather than
the Boy Scouts excluding homosexuals, the case conceivably might
have come out differently. Here, I allude to the bugaboo of the worry
about homosexual scout leaders seducing boys or inspiring them-
through their positive role models-to become more tolerant of
homosexuals or indeed to become homosexuals (if one becomes a
homosexual as distinguished from being one). Presumably there
would be no analogous fear about adult Jaycees.
Finally, the majority opinion in Boy Scouts states that "we must...
give deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression" and that "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the
very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." '229 What if a white
supremacist/separatist group objected to admitting blacks on the
ground that doing so would impair its expression of its separatist view
and would force it to send a message that association between whites
and blacks is a legitimate form of behavior? The Court in Roberts was
not bowled over by analogous arguments of the Jaycees, for it held:
"[Any claim that admission of women as full voting members will
impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are
not permitted to vote is attenuated at best. '2 30
Justice Stevens insightfully brings concerns for equal citizenship
into the analysis. He argues that "[u]nder the majority's reasoning, an
openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the label 'homosexual.'
That label, even though unseen, communicates a message that permits
his exclusion wherever he goes.... [R]eliance on such a justification is
tantamount to a constitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority."23'
Rehnquist does not even attempt to answer Stevens's powerful
critique. Furthermore, Stevens sees the analogy between this symbol
of inferiority and that involved in Loving v. Virginia2 32 and racial
prejudices more generally. 33  An anti-caste principle of equal
protection would condemn both alike. Here it is well to recall that the
229. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 653.
230. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
231. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
233. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 699-700 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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whites in Brown v. Board of Education23 4 asserted a freedom of
association claim: freedom not to associate with blacks.235 Rehnquist
may fail to see the analogy or may reject it.236 In any case, his opinion
does not face up to it.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have merely outlined a constitutional
constructivism that is analogous to Rawls's political constructivism,
focusing on certain aspects of securing deliberative democracy. I have
explored what the structure of the First Amendment would look like
if we were committed, not to protecting an absolutist First
Amendment in isolation from the rest of the Constitution, but to
securing a fully adequate scheme of the basic liberties as a whole. My
aim has been to suggest that a Rawlsian guiding framework of basic
liberties might help frame our judgments concerning what to do when
confronting clashes between freedom of expression and equal
protection. Those judgments would be guided by the aspiration to
accord priority to the family of basic liberties as a whole, not to give
priority to freedom of expression over equal protection.
234. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
235. See the much criticized analysis of whites' claim of freedom not to associate
with blacks in Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1959).
236. Rehnquist may well reject any analogy between discrimination on the basis of
race and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Here it is well to recall that
Scalia, in dissent in Romer, took umbrage at such analogies. See Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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